Theatre Commands: Urgent Need for India’s Security

The increasing threat on our borders, on Ground, Sea, and Air, give rise to an urgent need for Theatre Commands where the three Services work in unison. In fact, many of the Para Military Forces also need to come into sync. We initiate a panel discussion featuring some of the senior most officers of the defence establishment, with a most varied and active experience in the field. Presented are the highlights:

Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (Retd): Let me start by saying, that the maritime security challenges are big, and general security challenges are even bigger. Whereas at sea, unlike the land borders, we have no borders and all seafarers globally, are free to use it for passage, trade, commerce, and also illegal activities because the rules are quite fluid.

At the moment, the biggest challenge that we are seeing is the geopolitical contest of supremacy between two big powers in the Indo-Pacific, and particularly playing out in Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China has violated all the provisions of United Nations convention, on the laws of the sea and continues to threaten the world. Apart from Taiwan and Senkaku Island of Japan, the Philippines maritime territory at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, have been violated, virtually every day. The Chinese arrival in the Indian Ocean was preceded by economic coercion of all our neighbours which is a matter of grave concern, because the presence of Chinese ocean research vessels, engaged in monitoring hydrological data in the IOR, are very vital for programming their torpedoes against our warships and submarines. It also helps the submarine deployment of the Chinese and they are here in IOR very frequently.

I would say that our neighbours Sinicization is in progress. Recently what we saw in Bangladesh, I would say that the geopolitical game in the Bay of Bengal has begun. So, it is not going to be peaceful anymore because China’s influence on Myanmar and Bangladesh will increase. The Americans have now landed in Bangladesh, and they have also allocated money to various insurgent groups officially in Myanmar. So, we are talking about pro-China governments, by the looks of it, around us, as you know Maldives, Nepal and recently Sri Lanka.

So, I would say that our own island territories, should be better defended. And our assets in the sea in this southern peninsula are now subject to reconnaissance, identification, and possible interdiction in the times of a great war. The last thing that I want to add in this is that, China-Pakistan nexus, the manner in which it is now panning out in the Indian Ocean, particularly Arabian Sea, we will find that the maneuvering space for the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean is going to shrink. We operated here with full freedom, it is not going to happen anymore, everything will be monitored, and that takes away our ability to strike or surprise the enemy. I can tell you that threats are no less over land borders where we have to guard against the infiltration. In Bangladesh, the Pakistan High Commissioner has been seen making trips to the Interim government, asking for what more they can do. Mr. Nawaz Sharif has gone on record saying that, we will correct the things we did wrong in 1971. So that’s, that’s a warning. I would say that there is fair amount of challenge in the neighbourhood as far as India is concerned. Not only maritime, but overall.

Lieutenant General PJS Pannu (Retd): Our land borders are basically rooted in the historical fault lines, where our borders have not been settled since independence. India has fought five wars, four with Pakistan, and one with China, primarily on the claims on Ladakh, and also Arunachal Pradesh. The threat perception today hasn’t changed. The disputed areas inspite of fighting five wars have not been settled. The wars have not guaranteed peace for the simple reason that the map lines still remain the same. Some lines did change and could have been permanently changed, eg, Haji Pir in 1965, but we gave away our wins due to political reasons.

1947/48, Pakistan attacked us with the hope that they will be able to forcefully take Kashmir. They were not successful. The Western Front continues to be live, and they remain on the offensive not only as far as the military planning is concerned, but also how they are indoctrinating their own population. And therefore, the disputes, have taken a different mould altogether, wherein the internal situation in India has also been affected through proxy war, not only in Kashmir, but also the Northeast.

So as a result, when you are looking at the future of warfare, things have undergone a change as far as the neighbourhood is concerned, China is almost a superpower, Pakistan was supported initially by the Western world against India, and today is supported by China. Whether the western world has stopped supporting Pakistan or not, is yet to be seen. As a result, our current land border challenges are coming from our adversaries, Pakistan, and China, individually and collectively. Our other neighbours too are fast becoming proxies of China and may pose a different challenge in the future. Therefore, the future wars are still going to be fought on the fault lines, which we have not been able to settle so far.

When you look at how Indian forces are going to face these challenges, India has constantly attempted to avoid war. We have largely been on the defensive, our offensive capability, including our nuclear capability, was basically to deter the adversary, not to attack. But it largely comes from a defensive mindset. Another dimension is our internal situation, where the Armed Forces are not only doing their main task, but are also involved in internal security duties.

Air Marshal (Dr) Sanjeev Kapoor (Retd): Airplanes and associated equipment are expensive, a new platform of a fifth-generation fighter or a C 17 Class of aircraft costs over 2000 Crores. If you need a Squadron of 12 aircraft, you need Rs 24,000 Crores. These assets are very difficult to procure, and have a gestation period, plus operating limitations viz, the runway length, infrastructure requirements and others which are also challenging. The air operations are dependent on weight, altitude, and temperature. The Chinese in the North are on a plateau, which is at an altitude of 10,000-12,000 feet.

The Chinese have made about eight to nine airfields in Tibet area, and they have positioned a large amount of air assets in these bases. These were visible during the Galwan crisis when our satellites picked up large numbers of air assets, close to Indian border. Pakistan on its part, has a depleting Air Force, which is India centric. India’s civil aviation has grown manifold. This has a direct implication on our military preparedness. Today, we have over 40-50 joint user airfields, where on Indian Air Force airfields, the civil traffic is flying. Air travel is growing at such a fast pace in our country that the airspace available is reducing for our own training and exercises. The air ranges are also reducing.

So, on one side is the growing civilian requirement, the other is the high cost of procurement and maintenance. Third is the maximum use of the Chinese technology along the border. The Chinese drones, radars, air defence have actually moved up along the borders from Ladakh to Arunachal, they have their sensors, they have their mobile posts, they have a real time satellite imagery. So, the next war that we have to fight would probably be a combination of technology and conventional. We also need to consider the vintage of our air assets, which are now difficult to maintain and operate. These are a few factors in my opinion, which need to be kept in mind amongst others while preparing for future challenges.

Commodore AJ Singh (Retd): There has been a shift in the nature of the maritime security threats, state on state conflict seems to have receded into the background and non-traditional threats, the transnational threats, climate change, piracy of Somalia, have come up. And there is also a view that, are Navy’s meant for this, or are Navy’s meant for war fighting. And obviously the Navy is meant for war fighting. So, do we need to structure ourselves to tackle a more immediate non-traditional threat? Or do we remain structured on tackling the conventional state on state threat? Around 1999-2000, the Indian Navy’s force structuring shifted from threat based to capability based.

Because naval assets are long-term, it takes time to build a ship. While the nature of threats may change, we must focus on an all-round capability which can tackle any threat. Coming to where we stand at the moment? Look, it’s not a coincidence that in the last four years, despite such a major standoff on the land border with China, the PLA navy, which maintains a force of seven to eight ships continuously in the Indian Ocean, has never come into contact with the Indian Navy. The PLA Navy is very clear about its limitations of being able to take on the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean. China maybe the largest Navy in the world by numbers, but they still lack three things. One is the power projection capability, to be able to operate in what they call the far abroad, which in this case relates to the Indian Ocean. They do not have the kind of numbers required to be able to project this power to take on a Navy like the Indian Navy, in the Indian Ocean. And thirdly, I think they still lack the confidence to be able to operate so far abroad. So, even though they have two aircraft carriers, their aircraft carriers have never ventured beyond their second island chain, on a deployment. But that is not to suggest that they’re not preparing for the future. They’re already building two more aircraft carriers. So, I’m reasonably confident by 2030 there will be a very substantial Chinese PLA naval presence in the Indian ocean. At the moment, I think the Indian Navy is very well structured to take on what the PLA Navy can produce in Indian Ocean. However, China is not only building up its Navy, but alongside it is building up its infrastructure capability in the Indian Ocean.

They’ve given two submarines to Bangladesh and created a base which can berth six submarines. Bangladesh will not have six submarines for the next 50 years. So why are they there? Because so far, the Chinese submarines could not operate freely in the Bay of Bengal, it was just too far for the submarines to come all the way from the Chinese mainland and operate freely. Now they have a place where they can berth their submarines in the Bay of Bengal. So, we are going to have to restructure our capabilities. We are very well equipped right now, but we have certain capability deficits which need to be addressed urgently, which I’m not sure is happening as urgently as it should.

Money notwithstanding, we have to focus on certain core capabilities, including unmanned technologies. We must have Aircraft Carriers because if we have to be a blue water Navy, then you have to have the assets capable of projecting that power. We don’t have any Nuclear Attack Submarines, at the moment. We need them as of yesterday. Ideally, we should have six. It takes 10 to 12 years to commission a nuclear submarine. So, if we are going prepare for taking on the Chinese Navy’s presence in Indian Ocean, let us say 10 years from now, we must start working on it. China will have 15-16 nuclear attacks submarines by 2030, of which three or four will be operating in the Indian Ocean at any given time. That will severely restrict our freedom of operation.

We also, must not ignore how they’re arming the Pakistan Navy. They are giving Pakistan Navy eight Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) equipped submarines. Now, why would a country with a 300-kilometer coastline, need so many submarines with AIP capability. They are also giving them four destroyers.

Navin Berry: The recent events in Bangladesh, where it is said, that the US is going to exercise fair amount of influence in Bangladesh, will that alter the position for the Chinese berthing their submarines?

Commodore A J Singh (Retd): Not really. Because, we don’t know what kind of presence US is going to set up in Bangladesh. They may have some intelligence or surveillance facility capability on St. Martin’s Island. But the Chinese have established themselves there. They have created a base BNS Shiekh Hasina, which is a commissioned establishment. Myanmar already has Chinese submarines. So, the Bay of Bengal is not going to be an Indian lake anymore.

Air Vice Marshal Rajeev Hora (Retd): To add to what you said, we need to keep in mind that majority of Bangladesh military equipment has come from China. So, they are totally dependent on them for spares etc. So, they cannot ignore China in preference to USA.

Major General Jagatbir Singh (Retd): The Indian Air Force has presently divided its resources into various Commands, with the ability to control and divert them wherever required. How is today’s model working? There is also a view that the Air Force is not in favour of Theaterisation. What is your opinion Air Vice Marshal Rajeev Hora?

Air Vice Marshal Rajeev Hora (Retd): First, talking about our security threats, while the capability of the enemy on the borders is increasing, the benefit of depth which we had continues to shrink, both on land and the aerospace. These threats are not standard conventional threats anymore. Now they’re all fusion-hybrid-grey, threats. All these threats are dynamic and all need to be addressed.

Are the defence forces prepared to meet these challenges? Armed Forces all over the world, generally prepare for the last war, which they fought. That’s a well-known truism. So, when the threats are so dynamic, we need to be equally responsive and nimble. It is not only the armed forces, it is the Higher Defence Organisation, which gives them the authority to be nimble. Like we had this incident of, someone asking for permission and permissions. No, if we keep doing that, we will never be able to address all these threats, which emerge so fast and have to be addressed fast.

The second question, specifically to the Air Force, that, somehow the Air Force is not in favour of Theaterisation. I will put a few thoughts in perspective here. The current structures, are the conventional structures, which are basically from World War II. All over the world, we stuck onto these.

Now, what happens is you have a small cake, right? This cake has 30 plus Squadrons of fighters, transport aircraft and helicopters. At any given time, you may say this is the number of aircraft, but aircraft are on maintenance, aircraft are on servicing, so the available aircraft will always be much lesser. Spares don’t come, sometimes spares may take one year to come. It’s a daily battle for the maintenance branch to keep the aircraft airworthy.

Air Marshal (Dr) Sanjeev Kapoor (Retd): A case in point, is to do with AN 32 aircraft, which were being upgraded. Suddenly the Russia-Ukraine war took place. Some components for the upgrade were coming from Russia and some from Ukraine. Now, with the war, both stopped. So, the upgradation stopped.

Major General Jagatbir Singh (Retd): Therefore, I get your point, when the cake is small, it is best to keep it centrally. Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar you have been both the Commander in Chief Andaman and Nicobar Command (CINCAN), and the CISC, so can you tell us how are the defence forces prepared for Theaterisation, what is the concept, and why is taking so long to implement?

Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar (Retd): This debate is very critical and I am glad that it has gone on for four years. Are we prepared in the present form? I would say, yes. Are we prepared for the future? I would question myself, looking at our adversaries. Can we do better? Definitely, yes. Is Theaterisation going to help us? Why should it be there in the first place? What is jointmanship and integration? So, the basic problem that a single Service approach has is that, whichever Service, presumes that it is in the lead, let us say it is land centric, then the Army says we are the ones who will prosecute. Similarly, the Navy, for maritime.

And as a result, the Air Force always feels that, okay, while the Air War starts earlier, but if they dominate both these, they’ll be able to actually become the determinants of outcomes of victory. So, what should we do? The CDS recently said that first, we need a joint culture, lack of which he felt was coming in the way of going forward in Jointness and Integration. And thereafter, he felt, as a consequence, Theaterisation will take place. But he also feels that Theaterisation is an imperative. Now, why do I say that Theaterisation should take place?

My experience is that of the Andaman Nicobar Command (ANC) as well as the Headquarter IDS, where we kind of supported the ANC. The challenges to that are, if I look at ANC as a sub theatre, the aspect which is critical is force generation. If you don’t have forces, which you can apply, and if they’re not ready, especially when ANC is 700 nautical miles away from the mainland, it will be a pipe dream to actually apply forces. Should something be allocated, or should we go all the way back to Headquarters and keep asking for resources? So, when I look at that, there has to be Tri-Service commitment of and also a lot of other support, to counter threats.

So, I would feel the time has come for Theaterisation. If you are looking at three theatres, which I think is the current thought process, then I would say that, dealing with our main adversaries, you have two, one on the West, one on the North, and the maritime is an exclusive domain, which is really huge. And I agree with my naval counterparts, that actually our assets are far too few. So is the case with the Air Force. Now, not only is Theaterisation important, it is a joint capability development, which is very essential. Unless you have jointmanship and integration and think together, you will always have a challenge of prioritisation.

So, capability development, and especially keeping in mind the time it takes for acquisition of big platforms, at least 15/20 years, has to be thought of, in fact, like yesterday. And then we have to decide what is our priority. Unless you look at Theatres, you won’t get the priority because there are overlaps already when you have a single Service support. And we have seen that we could have definitely done better in Kargil. 1971 is a very good example of executing jointmanship with people who were in the field in a Sub Theatre.

So, the big question in Theaterisation is, should you have forces allocated to Theatres? To my mind, certain forces will have to be allotted, and then there has to be a major central pool.

Why it has taken four years to come to an understanding as to, how does it work? Can you impose it top down? What is the role of the Service Chiefs?  These, to my mind, are the challenges to Theaterisation. My understanding is that within a year, we should give it a green signal and then we can keep refining it as we go ahead.

Major General Jagatbir Singh (Retd): On 6 September 2024, there was a discussion in Lucknow, where the RM was present along with the CDS and all C in C’s and they discussed various models of Theaterisation, as reported in the press. They spoke three Theatre Commands, located at Lucknow, Jaipur, and Thiruvananthapuram which look at China, Pakistan, and maritime respectively.  Moving ahead, may I ask Admiral Shekhar Sinha as to, what in your view would be the best organisation in implementing Theatre Commands in India, including the role of the three Chiefs?

Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (Retd): It is a tough question to address and get it right the first time. But I recall, when we first made the proposal and with great difficulty, the three Chiefs agreed to it. Our bigger problem had been internal rather than external, to be very honest. The primarily role of the three Service Chiefs would be to Recruit, Train, and Sustain. So, these three things, just like the American model and to some extent the British model. Then somebody said, what happens to the operational role of the three Chiefs?

So, the answer to that, which was given by us in the presentation at that time, that the CDS is the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and none of these big decisions are going to be taken by CDS all by himself. His group of advisors are going to be the three Chiefs, and therefore they’re very much in touch with the operational issues. So, while the Theatre Commanders, are fighting a war, the orders are going from the CDS with the concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, as far as operations are concerned. This, I think was by and large, accepted at that time. I don’t know if there has been any change thereafter.

To be very honest, even now, the Chiefs of each Service do not have an operational role. It is okay that they pass a broad directive. The wars are to be fought by the Commanders in Chief. The Commanders in Chief are well within their rights to follow the National War Book which very clearly lays down the duties of the Commanders in Chief. I’m sure all the Chiefs are very familiar with this. You may not get it right the first time, but the model should be implemented. Like you said, it should have been done yesterday. As we face hurdles, I am sure the generations ahead will fix it.

Major General Jagatbir Singh (Retd): Can I have your opinion, General Pannu?

Lieutenant General PJS Pannu (Retd): When you’re talking about Theaterisation, we initially start thinking about the three Services, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. And when we say that we have to deal with the problems, we are talking about the land border problems and the maritime problems. Of course, there is aerospace challenge, which is a separate dimension altogether, which neither the land nor the maritime domain operators really understand. Therefore, each Service has a huge responsibility towards safeguarding the territorial integrity, which includes land, air, and sea plus cyber and space. Maybe in simple terms, the Navy cannot go into the mountains, but Navy will have some amount of leverage in the ocean. So therefore, if there are challenges in the mountains, I think Navy is most suitable to counter it by doing something in the ocean. And in ocean, if we have a problem, then the Army, can counter it by creating a criticality on the land border so that the pressure is released on the Navy. So, there is a relationship. But neither can land forces fight in the ocean, nor can the naval forces fight on land. So therefore, it is unlikely that a naval officer will get posted to command any force which is used or applied to fight on the land and, and vice versa. The Air Force can go both ways.

There are other issues too. Post Kargil, based on Kargil Review Committee, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was created to integrate the MoD with the Defence Forces. This because, the bureaucrats were not experts in defence matters. Did the integration really happen? No. Now the CDS and Department of Military Affairs (DMA) has come up. The IDS must be intrinsic to the DMA. The Space agency, the Cyber agency, the Special Forces have come up. Have these three actually integrated the land, air and marine components together? We need to anticipate Multi Domain Operations in future which will require technology integration. Do we have integrated, Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR)? Did we have any ISR during Kargil operation? No. Did we have that during Galwan operations? Answer is, No. From Kargil to Galwan was 20 years. Did our intelligence agencies in 20 years become any better? If they were better, then we would not have been surprised in Galwan. Now, in simplistic terms, if we are attacked on any land border, the first responder today is the border guarding force, either the BSF or the ITBP, which themselves are not fully integrated with the Army.

Major General Jagatbir Singh (Retd): The Kargil Review Committee covered this issue too. They said that there’s lack of coordination between the defence and the civilian authorities.

Lieutenant General PJS Pannu (Retd): Therefore, to ensure this coordination the Higher Defence Organisation itself needs a relook. The moment, the first shot is fired, the first casualty is our policy. The soldier is confused with conflicting orders, you will not cross the LC/ LAC, you will not fire first etc. It means we will have to face the brunt. First, we will have to have a casualty, only then we will react. So, we become reactive. In Galwan, in Kargil, in Sumdorong Chu, everywhere we were reactive in nature. When we talk about our international borders, we say that Pakistan occupied Kashmir belongs to India, Aksai Chin, belongs to India, and yet we need permissions to open fire, or obey protocols and keep weapons strapped on the back, with the barrel pointing towards the ground. All these restrictions/stipulations, leave a very confused soldier on ground! Even if we get information, that the adversary is going to attack, are you going to take preemptive action? Will the Defence Forces act on their own? Are the bureaucrats and political masters completely on top of the situation to understand the type of threat building up and the best response? Therefore, my take is, let there be clear political orders, thereafter leave it to the Defence Forces and they will deliver, like they did in 1971.

You spoke about the Kargil War, and the Kargil Review Committee. At that time, they were talking about the CDS. Then the CDS was deliberated upon, and again deliberated upon for two decades, because the bureaucracy had one big military-civilian equivalence issue with that. Now, because of the four-star rank of the Theatre Commanders, the bureaucracy will cause another big problem in Theaterisation. I think, we need to put all that aside. Bureaucratic dominance should not be above National Security.

Therefore, we need to define the National Security Strategy first, the Theatres will flow out of that. The CDS has a huge task laid out for him. He has to resolve all the issues that I have spoken of. He needs to take the next step forward. He must also be the one-point contact and military advisor to the Prime Minister.

Major General VK Singh (Retd): Just to add, for Theaterisation to be truly effective, the need for integration is not only between Army, Navy, Air Force, there is a requirement for MHA and MoD to integrate too. In fact, as per the Union War Book several Ministries are involved, which require integration.

All the reporting from the border by the BSF and ITBP is done through their own chain of command, to the MHA. Both these forces are supposed to come under command the Army in war, but how can that happen without training, integration, trust, and respect. Exactly how many paramilitary forces, will come under command the Army and where? What is their training?  What weapons do they hold, are they compatible with the Army? Is the ammunition the same? Are the re-supply chains and logistics practiced and rehearsed?  I am aware that some kind of Army-BSF training is carried out, but you need to be truthful, there are so many question marks in all this. So therefore, the MHA and the MoD need to be integrated, and all border related reports must come to the Army first hand. Shouldn’t the Director Generals of the Paramilitary forces be from the Defence Forces?

Another issue that you mentioned, which is even more pertinent and important, is the role of the intelligence agencies. Who is responsible for internal and external intelligence? Who are the IB and R&AW reporting to? Is the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) delivering? The Defence Intelligence Agency has been set up, but is it getting real time information from all Intelligence Agencies? The NTRO was set up in 2004 to provide technical intelligence. However, as per its mandate the NTRO works under the NSA and the Prime Minister’s Office. Should not this intelligence be shared with the Defence Forces in real time? Are these agencies not accountable? I am aware that there are existing hotlines between the senior officers, but are they used? Therefore, there is a need for all these intelligence agencies to be integrated with the Theatre Commands in the future. There should be no delay by any agency, in reporting matters of National Security to the Theatre Commander(s), irrespective of their chain of command and parent ministry.

Commodore AJ Singh (Retd): Another point is that why are we restricting this matter of reforms only to the military? How many people have said, how has the MoD been reformed? When China went for Theatre Commands, they re-structured the entire Central Military Commission. In USA, the complete Pentagon was re-structured, but we are not looking at that at all. So, the Defence Secretary or the Secretary Defence Production, are maintaining status quo. That nobody’s questioning. Like General Pannu said, why are we not insisting that the entire Higher Defence Organisation be restructured?

Navin Berry: So therefore, the question is that before we prepare ourselves for adversaries like China or Pakistan or anyone else, and we talk about wars or Theaterisation, our biggest war, which is and has been happening for years under our own eyes and noses, is the turf war, that is endemic to the Indian system, whether it is governance, or it’s bureaucracy or it’s anything else. As we are moving on, defence is becoming more and more critical. Everything else should be secondary. If you are not able to guard your own country, what are we talking about anything else for? So, I think the need of the hour somewhere, is to impress the planners that we leave the defence forces out of turf war. And we need to just integrate ourselves on all these fronts.

Air Vice Marshal Rajeev Hora (Retd): The United States in 1986, brought in this Goldwater Nichols act. Incidentally, those two Senators knew more about the defence forces than the defence forces knew about themselves. So here, is one thing lacking. We don’t find, though they may not admit, that kind of level of understanding at the political and bureaucratic level about the Armed Forces. So, the CDS and other officers should render advice, at the appropriate level, because of their domain knowledge.

Major General Jagatbir Singh (Retd): Going further, General Rajeshwar, at what level do you feel the Theatre Commander should look at and, can you tell us something about the PLA and the US models?

Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar (Retd): All models are different. Whether it be US/UK/Australian or Chinese model. We have to devise our own model. My first point is who will you put as the Operational Commander? Second, if it is the CDS, the earlier CISC used to do all the acquisition, procurement, brief the RM, etc. Today the CDS is doing that, okay, so is one CISC enough or should have a Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS)? My answer is, there has to be a VCDS who should look at the operational issues, which is in the UK model. In our case, it could be the CDS to oversee along with the Chief of Staffs Committee.

Major General Jagatbir Singh (Retd): The CDS currently wears three hats as, Chairman, Chief of Staff Committee, CDS, and Secretary DMA. So which hat do you think he needs to shed?

Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar (Retd):  My understanding is that he will continue to be the principal military advisor. That means he’s going to be called every time, and there is nothing which stops the political masters to call the particular Service chief as well. So, there is no conflict with that. Secretary, DMA is something that has been put on him, which we were thinking would come to the CISC. To my mind, his load should be lightened and therefore it should roll down to CISC.

So now he wears two hats. If that is the case, the main issue is, that it should not be construed that it is Headquarter IDS and the CDS who is carving this out, all the three Services must take ownership that this is a joint solution.

Another thing is the role of SFC is different, and I think we should leave it out at present. Whereas Headquarter IDS and ANC, I see no problem in all three Services, including Coast Guard.

The structure of C in Cs should be retained. Why? Because C in C is actually an Operational Commander. He could be under the Theatre Commander, right? The Theatre Commander has got forces allocated to him. So, he’s one who can apportion within his sub theatres. Acquisition, is a major thing where the Service Chiefs come in. That, I feel that is their role, the Theatre Commander can give inputs, but thereafter, I think is best left to the Service Chiefs.

Now, the next thing to my mind is, that the Theatre Commanders should be four-star rank, because there is a requirement of being able to outrank the Sub-Theatre Commanders, who are C in Cs, okay? And to be able to give very specific directions. And the CDS then, calls the shots since he’s sitting in Delhi with the Chief of Staffs Committee. So, he gives the advisory and the reserves that he holds with him. This will also help prioritisation of capability development, and it will give enough roles to play for everyone. This will give leaner organisations for theatres that will help them focus on how to prosecute the operational strand of warfare. Yes, there are other organisational challenges. One of the main things is we should get our house in the military in order. I fully understand integration is a whole of a government approach.

I think we have to go forward. We should not wait till everything falls into place. I think it’s a pipe dream that things fall into place. That never happens. There is an active enemy on the other side. You have to deal with him, and you have to make plans for it. All that can happen, only if we quickly get into some shape. Have a Joint Doctrine, so that training can take place, operations can take place. Make out your National Defence Strategy. The Raksha Mantri’s Operational Directive is crystal clear to war fighting Commanders. Therefore, by Theaterisation, you are increasing the operational efficiency in warfare. I am well aware of the current plans on Theaterisation, but just to hasten the issue, I feel that the ANC which was created in 2001 as a Tri-Service Command for integration and jointmanship, is a well-established structure. We could start by Theaterising the Andaman & Nicobar Command. It could well be the test bed for future Theaterisation.

It is not necessary for every Theatre Command to have dedicated forces of Army, Navy, and Air Force, that is not mandatory. However, it must have all elements that are necessary to carry out successful operations, for example, the Northern Theatre Command does not need any dedicated Naval component. If there is a requirement of any Naval interdiction, in support of the Northern Theatre Command, then that can be ordered centrally by the CDS. So, when we talk about Theatre Commands in the Indian context, we are talking about dedicated resources, that are necessary as dictated by the ground realities, for conduct of operations in that Theatre.

Air Vice Marshal Rajeev Hora (Retd): You had asked me earlier that why is the Air Force reluctant, and what is the structure that, you are looking at?

We are getting news that there would be a Northern Theatre Command, Western Theatre Command and a Maritime Theatre Command initially.

Everything that the Air Force does is not visible. The Air Force looks after the full Air Defence, Counter Air Operations, deep interdiction, air to air refuelling, and many functions.

So, I have a suggestion that, since the air is encompassing all these domains, we should have an Air Command, which is not geographical. For the Air Command you can’t say this is my boundary, you peel off from here, because in the air, you can’t make geographical lines.

So, the Air Command is the one which should run the all the operations. The other Theatre Commanders, want aircraft under command. So, out of the cake, you give them assets under command. If they want more, then the Air Command supplements them from somewhere else. That is the structure that can work.

Major General Jagatbir Singh (Retd): To conclude, I suggest, we must take the proverbial first step of our thousand-mile journey. Transition has to be done. It has to be delicately done, while retaining balance. As all panelists have clearly brought out, this is something that has to be done, but in what timeframe and in what manner, is best left to the executors.

Navin Berry: Very incisive comments. I think very constructive suggestions have emerged. As the only non-specialist on this panel, I get two senses. One is that a lot of action needs to be taken, not tomorrow or day after, but actually yesterday. And we have lost and continue to lose time. The second sense that I got was that today we have a government in position that often talks about disruption in age old and weathered thinking. It has acted in various verticals in this spirit. And I think very clearly, we need some major disruption in how we are looking at the structure of the defence forces; that is the sum and substance of the discussion today.

I think that time is right now, that we just clean up what is on the table today, start looking afresh at what we have, check what are my resources? What are my shortcomings? And I think that disruption is actually the need of the hour. Just put new things on the drawing board and put them all together. Get our act with a new refresh mode.


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