In conversation with Maj Gen SC Mohanty, AVSM (Retd), then Chief Operations Officer of 56 Mountain Brigade
When and how were you associated with Operation Vijay?
I consider myself immensely fortunate to have been posted as Brigade Major of 56 Mountain Brigade during the operations. The brigade was deployed for counter insurgency operations in the Kashmir Valley as part of 8 Mountain Division. We were the first brigade to be inducted for the operations to evict the intrusions into the Kargil sector during May-July 1999.
What were the circumstances under which you were inducted?
We were deployed at Wusan in the Ganderbal District of J&K for counter insurgency operations without being part of a grid and were thus available for induction without discernible turbulence in the counter insurgency grid as such. Ours was in fact, a reserve brigade for large scale counter insurgency operations The magnitude of intrusions became perturbingly clear in the first week of May and in fact one of our units, 1NAGA was inducted post-haste to limit the depth of intrusions. The circumstances were one of ambiguity and anxiety. We, as a brigade were inducted in the second week of May. The information about the enemy, till then termed as Mujahideens, was absolutely scanty.
What were the initial challenges?
Yes, there were many challenges. Firstly, we had to reorient ourselves from counter insurgency operations in the valley to conventional operations in high altitude areas over 15,000 feet. Troops require acclimatisation to operate in high altitudes due to rarefied atmosphere. There was neither time nor a suitable place to undertake such activities as training, rehearsals, and acclimatisation. One of the predominant challenges was indeed the lack of information about the enemy both in terms of their likely strength, deployment and kind of equipment held. A significant portion of the National Highway leading to Drass and Leh was under direct observation of the enemy lending itself to interdiction by mortar and artillery fire inflicting casualties even before troops could be build up. We were short of maps and even fire support to launch attacks. Contrary to operations in the plains you require greater number of fire units for softening up of objectives in mountainous terrain.
What were your initial tasks?
On induction we were located at Drass, with the battalion headquarters of 16 GRENADIERS, who were responsible for Drass and Mashkoh valley to maintain sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC). As the first brigade to be inducted and placed under 3 Mountain Division, we were responsible for the area between Kaobal Gali to Bhimbat and the task was not only to limit further intrusions but launch expeditious operations to evict the enemy intrusions perched on dominating features. We were under devastatingly accurate and constant enemy artillery fire. On one particular night, the enemy targeted the Brigade Headquarters with mortar fire with the mandir and stores barracks going up in flames. The ammunition dump close to Drass was also completely destroyed due to enemy fire, with shrapnel falling dangerously close to the Brigade Headquarters.
What was the most crucial operation in your sector?
Drass happened to be the Ground Zero of most major operations during the conflict since it was closest from the LoC to the National Highway and most suitable for interdiction. It was obviously the strategic intent of the enemy. Detachments were skillfully deployed on dominating heights like Tololing, Point 5140 and Tiger Hill. It was absolutely imperative to eliminate occupation of these dominating positions by the enemy at the earliest. To my mind, the most important objective in the entire conflict zone was the capture of Tololing, which was the closest and had the most intimate domination over the National Highway and the Brigade Headquarters itself. It was a national embarrassment interdicting the main lifeline to Leh and thence to Siachen by road. There was understandably tremendous pressure on us to capture Tololing at the earliest.
Can you recount events leading to capture of Tololing?
The initial operations for capture of Tololing was launched with effect from 22nd May 99. Contrary to our assessment and the information provided to us, the resistance was extremely heavy and as discovered later, the enemy had covered the limited approaches with overwhelming fire of automatic weapons and impregnable defences. The Sangarhs (defences based on stones and large boulders) were able to withstand even direct fire of Rocket Launchers and missiles. The initial attacks were launched by 18 GRENADIERS which resulted in a number of casualties including Maj RS Adhikari (later awarded the Mahavir Chakra posthumously) and Lt Col R Viswanathan (later awarded the Vir Chakra posthumously), the second in command of 18 GRENADIERS, who laid down their lives in two separate attacks, leading troops from the front.
The initial attacks having not succeeded, 18 GRENADIERS firmed in for subsequent attack by 2 RAJPUTANA RIFLES. Having learnt our lessons, we accorded adequate time for day and night reconnaissance of the objective from multiple directions. The COs of the two units were impeccable professionals. Col Kushal Thakur was nearly worshipped by his troops and commanded the unit admirably under very heavy odds and against severe constraints. He refused to be pulled back despite suffering large number of casualties insisting “I will fall back only after Tololing is captured or be carried back.” I had extensive interaction with him even during counter insurgency operations in the valley. Col Ravindranath was an unwavering, methodical and acutely professional leader who finally flew the flag over Tololing Top on 13 Jun but not without his share of sacrifices. Their casualties included Major Vivek Gupta (later awarded the Maha Vir Chakra).
Capture of Tololing eventually turned the tide against the Pakistani intruders, firstly substantially eliminating direct observation over National Highway (though observation was also possible from Point 5140 and Tiger Hill) and facilitating subsequent capture of other objectives in the sector. It was a huge morale booster and motivation for the entire Indian Army.
What would you consider as the basic tenets of victory over Pakistan’s nefarious designs?
First and foremost, it is not the Army, the Air Force or the Navy alone which fights a war. It is the nation which goes to war. In the instant case, the Nation rallied together as one and stood solidly behind the Armed Forces.
The raw courage, steadfastness, exemplary leadership and tenacity of young officers and men against unsurmountable odds won us the war. No matter how gigantic the challenges were, the men and officers took it on their chin and delivered. There were many unknown soldiers and officers who may not have figured in the list of gallantry awardees, but their contribution was no less significant.
The media played a significant role in mobilising public opinion including international support in favour of the Nation and armed forces for showing remarkable restraint. For the first time, live battle scenes were streamed into drawing rooms across the nation.
There are intangible aspects of regimentation, leadership, espirit de corps and training which the Indian Armed Forces are known for, the World over. These are undoubtedly battle wining factors.
Artillery, which was initially in short supply was build up and played a significant role, especially the Bofors in direct firing role. No wonder it was termed as ‘the Gods of War’ since the conflict. Even the Pakistanis acknowledged the effect of Bofors on them.
How do you think the situation has changed since last 25 years? Is there a possibility of repeat of Kargil 99?
Indian Armed Forces are far better prepared now with better equipment, training, infrastructure in the forward areas, surveillance, and logistics. Induction of new equipment with the Air Force and Army have enhanced their capability manifold in terms of mobility, precision shooting and lethality. India is in a much better position now diplomatically, economically, militarily, and informationally with reduced tolerance to misadventures by Pakistan. The retribution could be cost prohibitive for a precariously placed Pakistan; politically, economically, and militarily. I am sanguine, this time around, there would be no restriction on crossing the LoC to make irreversible gains in PoK.
