As we reminisce and celebrate the grand Indian victory of Kargil in 1999, it is pertinent to trace the perfidy of our Western neighbour, whose actions have not only cost countless lives and millions of rupees, but also cruelly snatched away the love of a father from so many children and the support of a husband and son from many a wife and parents when they needed it most.
A Scheming Neighbour
At midnight on 14 August 1947 on the eve of Indian independence, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru delivered his famous speech,
“Long years ago, we made a tryst with destiny. Now the time has come when we shall redeem our pledge – not wholly or in full measure – but very substantially. At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. …….”
However, while the echoes of the PMs speech were yet to fade, India did indeed awake, albeit to another reality – PAKISTAN.
Operation Gulmarg. Before the joy of independence had sunk in, Pakistan Army launched Operation Gulmarg, and invaded Jammu and Kashmir on October 22, 1947, bringing in its wake horrifying mass plunder and vandalism. Thousands of men, women and children were mercilessly slaughtered by the intruders. Four days later, on October 26, 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession, merging his State with India. Following the accession of the state to India, Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar, to repel the armed invasion. So began India’s first war with Pakistan.
Shaksgam Valley. Pakistan remained on the lookout for another chance and sensing India’s predicament post the 1962 war, they unilaterally handed over the Shaksgam Valley to China in 1963. The Shaksgam Valley, was part of the Hunza-Gilgit region of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, a territory over which Pakistan had no sovereign rights.
Operation Desert Hawk/Operation Gibraltar/Operation Grand Slam. In 1965, Pakistan was again on the prowl. The Indo-China war probably created an image of a weak nation in the mind of Pakistan’s leadership. Therefore, to test the Indian Armed Forces and the Indian government’s preparedness and response under the leadership of Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri, Pakistan once again launched a full-scale attack on four Indian posts Sardar, Vigokot, and Chhad Bet in the Rann of Kutch on April 24th, 1965. This operation was named Operation Desert Hawk. The attack was suitably stalled and on 01 July 1965, both nations signed the ‘Kutch Agreement.’ But this was not the end of the Indo-Pak conflict. Pakistan, within two months of the Kutch Agreement, initiated Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir. On August 05, 1965, Pakistani troops masquerading as Kashmiri locals crossed into Kashmir, with the aim of starting an insurgency among the locals against the Indian government. Operation Gibraltar was a failure since the presence of Pakistanis was reported to the Indian authorities by the locals themselves. The Indian Army responded and threw the invaders out, and captured the Haji Pir Pass. Still unsatisfied, on 01 September, Pakistan put into action its Operation Grand Slam aimed at capturing the town of Akhnoor in Jammu, to cut the Kashmir Valley from the rest of India. However, the Indian Army thwarted this attack too.
The pre-war intelligence failure leading to the both 1962 and 1965 wars was partly responsible for India setting up the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW).
Operation Searchlight/Operation Chengiz Khan. The Pakistanis did not even spare its own from treachery. A brutal genocide was carried out by the Pakistani Army against the local Bengalis of East Pakistan resulting in a mass refugee movement into India. On 25 March 1971 Pakistan launched Operation Searchlight against the Bengali independence movement. The Bengali armed resistance Mukhti Bahini arose against the Pakistan army and the Indian forces helped them with arms and training. War was inevitable. On 03 December 1971, Pakistan launched Operation Chengiz Khan with the Pakistani Air Force striking Indian airfields at Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Avantipura, Ambala, Sirsa, Halwara, and Agra. The rest as they say is history. Pakistan’s Army was routed and subjected to a humiliating surrender on 16 December of more than 93000 soldiers.
Operation Meghdoot. The incorrigible neighbour still did not learn any lesson. During the 70s, he started laying claim to the Siachen Glacier area, by surreptitiously permitting foreign mountaineering expeditions into the area. So much so that, when the Indian Army sent patrols to Siachen, Pakistan had the audacity to protest stating, “Instruct your troops to withdraw south of Point NJ 9842, any delay in vacating our territory will create a serious situation.”
The Indian Army launched Operation Meghdoot on 13 April 1984. The primary objective of the operation was to pre-empt the seizure of Sia La, and Bilafond La passes by the Pakistan Army. Bilafond La had been used as a traditional Pass for climbing from the West. From the North to South, there were four important passes on the Saltoro Ridge: Sia La, Bilafond La, Gyong La and Chulung La, where the Tri Colour soon fluttered in the icy winds. This was the fourth encounter with Pakistan.
The Kargil Chapter
Relevance. Musharraf’s plan was to occupy all the heights overlooking the Srinagar-Leh highway, so as to continuously interdict the traffic and in the process make the Indian Army’s sustenance in Ladakh untenable. He was also smarting from the Siachen episode, and hoped to weaken India’s hold over the Saltoro Ridge and occupy the area once again. For India such an audacious plan was simply a no go. Irrespective of the sweet talk of Nawaz Sharif, there was no way India would accept a serpent in its own backyard. Notwithstanding the cost the enemy had to be thrown out.
Overview. A part of the Kargil chapter remains shrouded in mystery, that is, how did we allow it to happen? By 1999 we already knew so much about our neighbour’s nefarious designs, then how could we allow ourselves to be surprised. How could we begin to trust someone who had repeatedly proved to be untrustworthy. One of the most probable reasons is the timing of the Lahore declaration, signed between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on 21 February 1999. There was an atmosphere of “aman ki aasha.” Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s words had reverberated through Lahore on 19 February, 1999.
“Hum jung na hone denge … Teen bar lad chuke ladayi,
kitna mehnga sauda… Hum jung na hone denge…”
Possibly these words had a cascading effect on the security and intelligence agencies of our country and some closed their eyes and some closed their minds, to what was clearly visible months before the conflict. The intelligence failure was compounded by a sense of disbelief in the highest echelons that while Pakistan was signing the Lahore Declaration his troops were secretly crossing into Indian territory in difficult high altitude mountainous areas with an aggressive intent. If this not deceit and treachery, then what is?
Operation Vijay
On 03 May 1999, on a clear morning, five thousand metres above sea level, Tashi Namgyal surveyed the endless wilderness. Far in the distance, he thought he could see the small, black dots he had been looking for. Together with his friends Ali Raza and Morup Tsering, Namgyal had hiked up the Yaldor ridge, that leads to the massive Chorbat-La Range. Armed with an ancient muzzle-loading rifle, he was hoping to hunt a mountain goat, but when he looked again through his binoculars, he saw soldiers. The information was hastily conveyed to the nearest Army unit. Soon thereafter, 3 PUNJAB, launched two lightly armed patrols to investigate Namgyal’s story. Both patrols were ambushed and forced to retreat.
The magnitude of Pakistan’s invasion and preparation were still unclear as plans were prepared to evict the infiltrators from the Indian side of the LoC. The initial inputs suggested that there were a handful of jihadis who would soon be evicted. The magnitude of the threat soon became clearer and the army realised that the operations to recapture the ridgelines back from Pakistani regulars would be extremely difficult. Infantry assaults would have to be undertaken at very high-altitudes while facing heavy enemy fire from multiple directions. It is a well-known maxim that the mountains favour the defender and anyone who has occupied a higher feature has a distinct advantage. In addition, to avert escalation of the conflict, the Indian government stipulated that the LoC should not be crossed by the Indian Armed Forces.
The limited war, in response to Pakistan’s Operation Badr, was fought over a 170 km, mountain frontier, stretching from Mushkoh Valley to Turtuk. The intruders were thousands in number who had occupied every dominating feature. It took relentless infantry assaults supported by Artillery and Air Force over the course of next three months, for the Indian Army to recapture all the areas that were covertly occupied by the Pakistan Army. Names such as Tiger Hill, Tololing, Point 5140, Point 4700, Three Pimples, Chorbat La, Point 5203, Point 4875, Khalubar Top and Jubar Top were soon well known across the country. By the first week of July 1999, the Indian Tricolour was hoisted on Tiger Hill and by the third week of July, the Indian flag was flying across all the areas where the intrusions had taken place. But the victory came at a dreadful cost of 527 soldiers lost forever and 1363 injured.
The gallantry of Indian Army stood out. A total of three hundred gallantry awards were awarded to the soldiers who fought in the Kargil War, out of which there were four Param Vir Chakras; Captain Vikram Batra (Posthumous), Captain Manoj Kumar Pandey (Posthumous), Subedar Major Yogendra Singh Yadav and Subedar Major Sanjay Kumar became household names for their display of unparalleled gallantry during the Kargil War. Other officers, Junior Commissioned Officer’s and Non-Commissioned Officer’s, to name a few, Captain Anuj Nayyar, Captain Haneef Uddin, Captain Neikezhakuo Kenguruse, Lieutenant Balwan Singh, Subedar Nirmal Singh, Naik Digendra Kumar, Rifleman Imliakum Ao and many others displayed outstanding courage and determination throughout the war in different Sectors. For them, the accomplishment of the task given to their Units mattered more. Nam, Namak and Nishan remained the defining factor for which no sacrifice was too great. In the annals of military history, the sacrifices and valour of the soldiers and leaders remain unmatched. It was a heroic fightback against daunting odds. Accounts of their unflinching devotion to duty, relentless determination, leadership, and selfless sacrifice in the highest traditions of the Armed Forces have left a legacy that will continue to inspire future generations.
The Role of the Indian Air Force (IAF): Operation Safed Sagar
The Kargil Conflict was unique in the decision to employ airpower. The war demonstrated, the relevance of airpower and its effectiveness in the utterly demanding context of mountain warfare at high altitudes. The war offers an exemplary case study in the uses of airpower in joint warfare and the difficulties of employment of Air Force in high mountain conditions.
The IAF began conducting initial reconnaissance sorties over the Kargil heights, as early as 10 May 1999, less than a week after the presence of the enemy incursion was first confirmed. On 12 May, an IAF Helicopter was fired upon near the forwardmost Pakistani position overlooking Kargil. In the next few days, IAF conducted Tactical Reconnaissance sorties to gather target information.
On 21 May 1999, the presence of the personnel from the Pakistani 4th and 6th Battalions of the Northern Light Infantry’s and their positions was determined by an IAF Canberra bomber of the 106th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron. On the morning of 26 May 1999, IAF commenced air operations by attacking enemy positions and supply lines. The first strike was launched by MiG-21, MiG-27ML & MiG-23BN fighters. MiG-29‘s provided Air Defence cover to the strike aircraft. Post-strike, Canberra’s carried out recce to assess the damage inflicted on the enemy.
In the initial days, the IAF suffered a few losses. Between 27 and 28 May, the IAF lost two aircraft—a MiG-21, a MiG-27 and a Mi-17 helicopter. On 27 May, the MiG-27, flown by Flight Lieutenant Kambampati Nachiketa developed mechanical problems forcing the pilot to eject. The MiG-21, flown by Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja orbiting in the area to look for Flight Lieutenant Kambampati Nachiketa was shot down by a shoulder fired heat seeking missile. Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja was awarded Vir Chakra Posthumously.
On 28 May 1999, Nubra formation, 4 x Mi-17 were tasked to strike ‘Point 5140′ feature, located two kms North of Tololing’. Nubra formation took off on time and initially all went perfectly well. However, Flight Lieutenant Subramaniam Muhilan was flying the Nubra-3 formation which got hit by the Stinger Missile. Despite Flight Lieutenant Muhilan’s best effort to control the damaged helicopter, it crashed killing him and all his crew members. He was awarded Vayu Sena Medal Posthumously. Wing Commander (later Air Commodore) Anil Kumar Sinha was the leader of the four aircraft formation. The rocket attack launched by the formation, despite the loss of one helicopter, was successful and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Wing Commander Anil Kumar Sinha was awarded the Vir Chakra.
It was the air strikes conducted by the IAF on some of the key locations, including Tiger Hill on 24 June where Laser Guided Bombs were used to decimate the enemy. The most prominent among them is the strike on the Muntho Dhalo where the Pakistanis had built a supply camp in a bowl-shaped valley. Over the days it grew into a major supply depot. The strike of 16 June and 17 June by MiG-27s and Mirage-2000s were devastating and later attacks in the area ensured destruction of fresh Pakistani attempts to reuse the base.
Operation Safed Sagar was a steep learning curve for the IAF and prompted an overhaul of weapons and tactics that began almost immediately after the campaign.
The Role of the Indian Navy: Operation Talwar
Operation Talwar involved protective activities such as bolstering our coastal defences and jointly conducting maritime patrols along with agencies such as the Coast Guard. Warfighting assets such as ships, submarines, and aircraft fully armed were deployed.
The Indian Navy blockaded Pakistani ports, primarily Karachi, cutting off supply routes and began aggressive patrols and threatened to cut Pakistan’s sea trade. This affected Pakistan’s dependence on sea-based oil and trade flows. The Pakistan Navy flew its maritime aircraft and once the scale and span of the Indian deployment sank in, it went into a defensive mode, warning its vessels to steer clear of the Indian Navy.
It was not that the Naval operations and activities were limited to maritime domain. The Navy’s Squadron of specially equipped electronic warfare aircraft operated extensively along the Line of Control in support of land operations. Specialist hydrographic survey teams of the Indian Navy were conjoined with the Army’s artillery batteries to pin-point gun locations.
Operation Talwar proved that credible maritime power can effectively safeguard national interests. Twenty-five years after the Kargil conflict, our credibility in the maritime domain has only increased.
A Deep Insight
The Kargil war was once again a wake-up call for the Indian establishment. But before that, we must come back to the same question, that how could it happen? The former Army Chief General VP Malik has stated in an interview in the Hindustan Times on 21 July 2024 that, “we were taken by surprise, because there were no intelligence reports with us, either from the Intelligence Bureau or from RAW. We took it as an intrusion by the Jihadis, in black salwar kameez and not by the Pakistan Army.” How could this be when we have various agencies created and funded to precisely provide this very information?
On the other hand, almost a year ago in mid-1998 the Intelligence Bureau’s (IB) had warned of increased military activity along the Line of Control in Kargil, notably near posts codenamed Chor, Hadi, Saddle, Reshma, Masjid, Dhalan and Langar, the very posts that served as base camps for Pakistani forces during the war. The then, IB Director Mr Shyamal Dutta issued a warning that he personally signed on 2 June 1998. But to whom did he address that letter and what did it say? Perhaps the Prime Minister or his Secretariat, perhaps not. However, it is pertinent to note that if there was such information that the IB Director had to sign the letter himself, it certainly would have been of prime importance and directly impinging on National Security. In such a case, the letter should have been copied to the Northern Army Commander and the Army Chief, which apparently it was not. Even later, if no action had been taken by whomsoever the letter had been addressed to, then the letter could have been rewritten, not once, but several times. There is no evidence of that either.
The Research and Analysis Wing also issued warnings about new Pakistan Army formations being deployed, but these warnings came when all hell had already broken loose. Besides such reports are also routine, which give names of formations relieving or being relieved. The report did not say anything specific.
Even the Army who is responsible for tactical information, had enough inputs that probably needed to be gone into detail and corroborated. A problem cannot be wished away, just because you are not ready to accept it. There were certain unexplainable events, as obtained by the authors from open sources.
Firstly, the Yaldor Company, which was a permanent deployment, was withdrawn in 1998, which, had it been there, the story would have been different.
Secondly, on 25 August 1998, the Brigade Major of the Kargil based 121 Brigade, Major RK Dwivedi, wrote to the higher headquarters, warning the push of militants across the Line of Control. The note, speculated the infiltrators would “engage National Highway 1A and target Kargil and outlying villages.”
Thirdly, on 30 August 1998, Major KBS Khurana reported an input of 500 Afghan militants having been brought to Gurikot, NJ 7959, to be further inducted into India in the near future.
Fourthly, from early 1999, the Army began a series of War Games to assess their strengths and weaknesses. These led to a conclusion that there was a shortage of troops in the Kargil Sector. Colonel Pushpinder Oberoi, the Commanding Officer of 16 GRENADIERS, pointed major weaknesses in Indian defences identified during the war-game, code-named `Exercise Jaanch’. He recommended that key posts be permanently manned, including Point 4660, which later became famous as Tiger Hill.
Fifthly, on 9 February 1999, and again on 4 March 1999, Maj Manish Bhatnagar, 5 PARA, spotted Pakistani troops in a bunker on Point 5770, a strategic height in the southern Siachen area and reported the same to his chain of command. That marked the first fire contact of the Kargil War as both sides opened fire. There should have been no element of doubt after that?
Although the warnings spoke of infiltrators and not a full-scale military incursion, they indicated significant developments on the other side, and should have been further corroborated. And do infiltrators construct bunkers? Also, cognisance should have been taken of the findings of the War Game. Unfortunately, this may not have been done. Finally, 11 days after the 3 PUNJAB patrols were ambushed in May 1999, Captain Saurabh Kalia headed up the Kaksar Langpa area to reoccupy a post abandoned during the winter. The Pakistan Army was waiting; Kalia’s mutilated body, and those of his men, were recovered later. A second patrol, sent to investigate, was also ambushed, leading to the killing of Captain Amit Bharadwaj and Havildar Rajvir Singh. Why was their denial from the Army after all this? At a meeting of the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar on 24 May 1999, Lieutenant General Kishan Pal insisted that the “situation was local and would be defeated locally,” and Northern Army Commander Lieutenant General Hari Mohan Khanna dismissed the idea of any major concern. This was, probably a preconceived notion.
In Summation
Several actions were prompted by the Kargil war. First, and the most comprehensive was the Kargil Review Committee (KRC), headed by K Subramanyam. The KRC came up with meaningful far reaching recommendations including modernization of conventional military power, reform the national security architecture and appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). It is matter of grave concern that it took two decades to implement the recommendation. Many other recommendations did not see the light of day.
General VP Malik has stated at a media briefing on June 23rd, that the Army had glaring shortcomings. There were deficiencies in weapons, equipment, ammunition, winter clothing and spares. He finally said, “we will fight with whatever we have.”
This led to panic import of all kinds of military equipment. A serious introspection is required that after 25 years, where do we stand now? Specially, when the myth of short, swift wars has been dispelled, following the Ukraine war. There is an urgent need for self-sufficiency, not only in arms and ammunition, but also all types of military equipment. Self-sufficiency has to cater for a surge mode, that in case a war extends beyond a stipulated period, our industry must have the capability to manufacture the enhanced demands.
Reforms were also initiated in the Indian intelligence agencies, with setting up of the Defence Intelligence Agency, Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI) and the National Technical Research Organisation. RAW, continued as the premier agency for external intelligence. However, here too, a question does prop up. That, if all these agencies were working well and working together, than how did China manage to surprise us in May 2020?
If there was evidence of the build-up, none of the agencies rang the alarm bell? All agencies appear to be working very hard, but they are not working together. Information is fed through respective channels and sometimes important information can get buried under a torrent of other information. When the stake is National Security, one-upmanship should be strictly avoided. KRC also said that the failure in Kargil was not the lack of intelligence information but of assessing and interpreting the available data. Data can only be correctly interpreted when the right person is analysing it.
A substantial geo-strategic outcome of the Kargil conflict was the turning away of the US from Pakistan, as Washington concluded it as irresponsible and unworthy of a partnership. The US chose to support India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group of countries, and thus legitimized India’s nuclear status. Moreover, the US began a new set of engagements with India, and particularly its military.
25 years later and in the midst of simultaneity in tipping points across the globe ranging from conflicts to Covid, some things stand out. These are the changing character of warfare and the transformation of the Indian Armed Forces. Character and conduct of warfare have changed with the growing use of terror and other irregular methods of fighting by non-State actors. Equally, important have been the technological advancements in cyber and space domains. At the same time there is room for extended conventional warfare. Therefore, we must look at the impact of these changed realities on the future. Indian Armed Forces must be prepared for the future conflict with a changed character because these would be very violent and unpredictable. The importance of human factor will remain undiminished. Soldiers will remain the primary assets. Battlespace will be contested and constrained by indeterminable factors. Recent conflicts have re-emphasised that unconventional and asymmetrical wars are gaining pre-eminence. In the future, even conventional wars are likely to have asymmetric component leading to ‘hybrid wars.’
In its epilogue, the KRC noted that “the Committee has after very wide interactions sign-posted directions along the path to peace, ensuring progress, development, and stability of the nation. How exactly the country should proceed to refashion its Security-Intelligence-Development shield to meet the challenge of the 21st Century is for the Government, Parliament, and public opinion to determine.”
Did Pakistan stop his perfidy after his defeat in Kargil? No. To name a few, high jacking of IC 814, Parliament, 26/11, Uri, Pulwama, and recently Jammu. We need to face this upfront, a change in strategy is urgently required.
There remains no doubt that we can safeguard peace only when we have the strength to make the enemy’s aggression costly and futile. Such a deterrence is only possible when the Defence Forces are optimally equipped and manned. We cannot afford to turn away from that responsibility any more.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Maj Gen VK Singh, VSM was commissioned into The Scinde Horse in Dec 1983. The officer has commanded an Independent Recce Sqn in the desert sector, and has the distinction of being the first Armoured Corps Officer to command an Assam Rifles Battalion in Counter Insurgency Operations in Manipur and Nagaland, as well as the first General Cadre Officer to command a Strategic Forces Brigade. He then commanded 12 Infantry Division (RAPID) in Western Sector. The General is a fourth generation army officer.
Major General Jagatbir Singh was commissioned into 18 Cavalry in December 1981. During his 38 years of service in the Army he has held various command, staff and instructional appointments and served in varied terrains in the country. He has served in a United Nations Peace Keeping Mission as a Military Observer in Iraq and Kuwait. He has been an instructor to Indian Military Academy and the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. He is a prolific writer in defence & national security and adept at public speaking.
