Introduction
In the recent past, one of the topics that has been the subject of much discussion, is the Agnipath Scheme. The scheme, for recruitment of soldiers into the Armed Forces was approved by the Government in June 2022 and implemented a few months later in September 2022. Personnel to be recruited under this system were called Agniveers.
The Scheme
The scheme was for both male and female aspirants of age group 17.5 years to 21 years. The recruitment through this scheme was to be held twice a year for the three services.
Agniveers would serve for a tenure of four years, including training of six months, followed by 3.5 years of service in units. On completion of four years, 25% of the batch would be selected for permanent cadre, to serve for at least another 15 years. However, these four years as Agniveers would not be counted in the pension benefits for those retained. Their seniority would start from the day they were inducted with fresh terms and conditions. The balance, who retire after four years of service will not be eligible for pension, but will receive a lump sum amount of approximately ₹11.71 lakh. The Government plans to recruit 45,000 to 50,000 personnel every year through this scheme, though the approximate number of retirees from the three Services is approximately 60,000 per year.
The Agniveers would receive a monthly salary of ₹30,000 in the first year, which will be progressively increased to ₹40,000 by the fourth year. All Agniveers will get allowances like risk and hardship, ration, dress, and travel. In case of death or disability while on duty, they will get compensation that includes a non-contributory life insurance of ₹48 lakhs, and an ex-gratia payment of ₹44 lakhs. On retirement, they will also not be eligible for benefits given to Ex-Service personnel, such as pension, Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme, Military’s Canteen Stores Department; and will also not be accorded ‘ex-serviceman’ status.
By May 2024, two batches of 40,000 Agniveers had completed training under the Army and 20,000 were under training. Three batches of 7,385 Agniveers in the Navy and two batches of 4,955 Agniveers in the Air Force also completed their training.
Agnipath Positives
The Raksha Mantri and the Service Chiefs hailed the scheme as ‘transformational’ and one that would have a positive impact on the human resource management of the Armed Forces. This reform will add a youthful profile to the armed forces. The Ministry of Defence estimated that the scheme will help reduce the average age of the Armed Forces from the present 32 to 24-26 years making it a more youthful military to deal with India’s security threats.
There were a series of Press Conferences in which senior officers listed out the scheme’s advantages.
It was also expected that the quick turnover of Agniveers would ensure a constant stream of technology-savvy youth by tapping into the talent available in technical institutes. With an enhanced technology threshold, these individuals would be adept at handling the modern equipment of the Armed Forces.
By retaining only 25 percent of Agniveers for permanent service, the military could pick the best among them, who would then be groomed for Non-Commissioned Officer ranks.
Lieutenant General Bansi Ponappa, who recently retired as the Adjutant General, assured that the Agniveers were undertaking all the actions – operational and professional just like other sepoys on ground. “They are completely integrated into the units. They wear the same uniform and perform the same duties.”
Financial Considerations
As brought out in many articles, but not acknowledged by the Government, financial considerations also weighed in, in the rolling out of this new scheme.
In the past the mandatory colour service increased from 7 to 15 years, increasing both the average age of soldiers as well as the pension requirements. The large increase in pensioners was compounded by the corresponding pay and pensions increase of the 6th and 7th Central Pay Commissions. Since pay and pensions remain a major part, most of the defence budget goes towards Revenue expenditure.
The Defence Budget is 15.6% of the Central Govt Expenditure. The Army accounts for about 68.1% of the defence budget and salaries and pensions of the three Services account for about 59% of the Revenue Budget. This leaves a small amount as Capital Expenditure for procurements to keep up with changing technologies and new weapons and equipment, and replacement of obsolete weapons and equipment.
The MoD’s personnel costs on Pay and Allowances and Pension have increased from 50 percent to 55 percent in the past 10 years. It is worth estimating the savings that will accrue on both defence salaries and pensions following the implementation of the Agnipath scheme. The monthly average salary of an Agniveer will be ₹45,338. This is nearly 24% lower than the average monthly pay of ₹59,976 of a current OR. This means an Agniveer would cost the government ₹175,656 less than a current OR every year. Assuming 60,000 Agniveers are inducted in the first year, the total saving on salaries would amount to ₹1,054 Crores, which would increase with the progressive rise in induction of Agniveers.
So, the financial dimension of the Agnipath scheme remains an important consideration, especially since the three Services are the only element of Government, that have not transitioned to the National Pension Scheme.
Critical Analysis of the Benefits of the Scheme
Without any doubt the authors of the Agnipath scheme did a lot of homework and had the larger interest of the Nation in mind while conceiving the scheme. However, a critical analysis of the scheme is required to make it more acceptable to the user.
Average Soldier Age Reduction. As mentioned earlier, the biggest benefit of the scheme is the reduction in the average age of the soldiers.
Yes, the average age will reduce, but was that really required? It takes many years to make a soldier, a soldier. An Agniveer straight out of six months training is still far from being useful as a soldier, he needs many more years of hardening and experience. It takes time to become part of the team, to become battleworthy. No Commander, at any level, will risk assigning/taking a young inexperienced recruit on an important mission.
‘Nation Building’ Benefits. There is a view that when we look at ‘Nation Building’ and demanding of accountability from the village level upwards or percolating of the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ across all the villages and Districts of India, then the demobilized Agniveers would be a good base to add to such ‘Nation Building’ efforts, village upwards.
They will certainly be a disciplined and trained work force. But their physical energies will have to be gainfully harnessed. Unemployment could lead to frustration and mental illness, which in turn may lead to anti-social activity.
Spreading Recruitment. It has also been reported that recruitment would now be spread across all 806 odd Districts of India, since as per the Recruitable Male Population model, about 70% Army recruits come predominantly from about 170 Districts of the country. All future recruitment will now be on an All India All Class basis.
Recruitment across the country is a welcome move and should always have been as such. However, a single class unit has a certain cultural homogeneity that bonds members into a fighting unit and creates the esprit de corps that, is hard to explain and can only be experienced, especially in warlike situations. The war cry is enough to stir such emotions, that even life means nothing thereafter. Will equal emotion be possible in All-India, All-Class unit? Are we tinkering with a well-established, time-tested system?
Financial Gains. The scheme will undoubtedly result in huge savings for the exchequer. Money saved can be used for capital procurements.
National security gained through capital procurements but compromised through transient manpower.
Other Agnipath Fallouts
There may be some other fall outs of the Agnipath scheme that have to be considered. These are practical realities that will invariably manifest in time. Viz.
Duties and Postings. The employment of Agniveers will be restricted to parent battalions and regiments. Agniveers cannot be posted to Rastriya Rifles Battalions because of their inadequate service and training. Similar would be the case of Extra Regimental Employment (ERE). The posting of soldiers on ERE is restricted to only skilled, trained, and experienced personnel. Thus, there will be the availability of a higher number of relatively inexperienced individuals within the battalions, who will have to shoulder the responsibilities of handling complex battle systems. This would have its own implications.
25:75. Unit cohesion, particularly in the Army, is a battle-winning factor. This comes through trust, bonding, common purpose, subordination of self-interest, and complete identification with each other. Are we not creating two classes within a well-knit cohesive outfit? The question also comes to mind is if Agniveers, totally uncertain about their future, would have the same morale and motivation levels as regular soldiers? And whether the competition among the Agniveers for the 25% permanent posts strengthen or weaken unit cohesion? By the fourth year of implementation of the scheme, there will be a sizable number of Agniveers in every unit, of which some individuals would have realised in the first few months itself, that they are unlikely to make the grade. Many others will be doubtful. What will be the motivation level of such individuals for the next two/three years?
Equipment Intensive Regiments. The short training period of six months of Agniveers will have its own implications. Some regiments like the Armoured Corps, Mechanised Infantry, Artillery etc., are highly equipment intensive. In normal course, recruits allotted to these arms undergo close to two years training, before joining the regiments. Even thereafter, they are put through recruit cadres to get them to understand the unit culture, improve physical and technical skills and only then be inducted onto actual equipment, as spare crews. Therefore, the freshly trained recruits are kept as spare crews and over the years, with on job training, and experience are graduated to the main crew list. In the case of Agniveers, 75% of the recruits will be on their way out before they can reach the stage of being considered for the main crew list, and the same cycle will continue with the next batch. Thus, there will be a perpetual pool of young inexperienced crews with varying motivation levels. The shortage of trained fighting troops, who are the foundation, the backbone of equipment intensive regiments, may shake up the very fitness of the regiment to undertake operations.
When it comes to the Navy and the Air Force, their manpower needs are far more technical. These Services will find it hard to employ the short-term contractual soldiers fruitfully, putting additional pressure on the permanent ones, and resulting in lower operational serviceability of modern weapons and platforms.
Resettlement Of Agniveers. One of the concerns pertains to future career prospects of those who need to be resettled. The Centre, and certain State Governments, have announced job reservations and other incentives for the demobilised Agniveers. The MHA and the MoD, for instance, have announced 10% reservation in several of their organisations for Agniveers. This may not be adequate to absorb all the demobilised Agniveers, but does provide reasonable hope for those who would be needing a job after their military service. The kneejerk handling of the 75% dropouts also shows that the scheme had not been thought through. One agency after another is announcing quotas for the retired Agniveers. However, will the promise of reservations be fulfilled?
Quality of Intake. There has been a concern regarding the quality of intake, as a soldier’s job which was viewed as permanent employment has now been turned into contractual employment. There were feelings expressed that this might not motivate aspirants looking for security of jobs, pension, and the honour of serving the country.
The ‘fauj’ was considered one of the most prized jobs in many states and was a key social determinant in rural or peri-urban localities. The Agnipath scheme with four years of service, no pension and gratuity, is no match to the pride and prestige associated earlier with a job in the Armed Forces.
The military profession is not just another job but a calling where individuals stand ready to sacrifice all, in service to the nation. Soldiers view themselves as fulfilling a higher purpose and are proud members of a profession built on values like honour, loyalty, integrity, self-sacrifice, and brotherhood. There should be no shift away from this calling towards viewing the military as a contractual occupation.
To feel the pulse on ground the authors did some research. There are some villages in India which believe only in two professions. Farming and Soldiering. The villagers take pride in sending more and more of their youth to the defence forces. For this, the young boys, from an early age, start training. Seniors already soldiers, on leave, become willing instructors. Thus, whenever there is a recruitment rally, many make the grade. With the Agnipath announcement the entire sense of enthusiasm has diminished. Now the defence forces are no longer the desired option. The young men need job security, so therefore, they are now opting for other uniformed forces. Unfortunately, only those left out, are opting for the Agnipath scheme, as a last resort. So, in other words, the cream of the youth is no longer opting for the defence forces. Therefore, the top 25% that will be selected for permanent cadre, may not actually be the top, but instead top 25% of the bottom. This is not good news for the nation.
Ayo Gorkhali: The Recruitment from Nepal
The Indian Army has seven Gorkha Regiments, which comprise 39 Battalions, with roughly 32,000 Nepalese serving in these units. The Gorkha soldiers provide a very strong link to the age-old friendly ties between Nepal and India. The Gorkhas have sacrificed their lives for the security of India.
The 1947 tripartite Memorandum of Agreement between Nepal, India and the UK provides the legal basis for Indian and the British Armies to recruit Nepalese citizens.
Currently, over 120,000 Gorkha pensioners in Nepal receive pension from the Indian Government. Nepal has also conveyed its disappointment for not having been consulted before the introduction of the Agnipath scheme.
There has not been a single Nepalese Gorkha recruited into the Indian Army since 2020, when recruitment rallies were halted due to Covid-19. The Indian Government announced the Agnipath scheme in June 2022. Initially, Government of Nepal asked the Indian side to suspend the recruitment temporarily. However, no decision has been taken and the recruitment of Nepalese citizens in the Indian Army continues on hold. According to open sources, the Indian Army is facing a shortfall of over 15,000 soldiers in its Gorkha Regiments. Majority of the Gorkhas in the battalions are from Nepal. To fill the void, the Army has started recruiting non-Gorkha youth from Garhwal and Kumaon. This would impact on the homogeneity of the Gorkha battalions.
Recently, Nepal’s External Affairs Minister Arzu Rana Deuba visited India from 18-22 August. Bilateral talks between the foreign ministers of India and Nepal in Delhi have raised hopes of resolving the stalled Gorkha recruitment.
Veterans Voice Concerns
Admiral Arun Prakash a former Naval Chief opined that the scheme will be difficult to implement in unison for the Tri-Services. He further said, “in its present form, is suitable only for the Army, whose large Infantry component is not excessively burdened with technology. In case of the Navy and Air Force, it must be recognised that at least 5-6 years are required before a new entrant can acquire enough hands-on experience to be entrusted with the operation or maintenance of lethal weapon systems and complex machinery and electronics”.
Lieutenant General DS Hooda a former Northern Army Commander has said; “it takes a lot of time, in my experience, at least 4-5 years for people to be trusted to work on the systems in their own individual capacity. For 4-5 years, you are under the tutelage of a senior person. At a time of four years, when they are ready to be exploited for their full potential, 75% of the Agniveers are asked to go. Then you get a new lot coming in, and you have to start from scratch.”
Ex-Army Jawans also voiced their apprehensions. Havildar Premjit Singh Brar, the District President of the Ex-Servicemen Welfare Union in Faridkot said, “Don’t experiment with the Army, what if they become gangsters after four years? This is a wrong move. No one will be interested in joining the Army on these terms and conditions. It is like raising a private Army. If someone dies on the border, they say they will only give him fixed compensation and that his family will not get any pension or any benefit. Why should anyone be willing to die under these circumstances?”
Psychological Impact
The hardest hitting impact on the 75% youth who miss the grade will be psychological. Can you imagine being termed as a failure at 21-25 years of age? When one has barely started out on a vocation in life, that too as noble as military service, and to be declared unfit; this will not go down well even with the strongest. And it will not end there, whichever profession they join next, they will always be viewed as rejects. They will be mocked all their life, because that is the way the world is. This psychological impact, this stigma, this blemish will not fade away with time. They will have to live with the stigma “bhai to fail ho gaya” …… We must examine this with all seriousness, because this psychological damage could impact society very adversely.
Conclusion
It is recommended that the first four years of the Agnipath Scheme should be treated as a validation period. The primary purpose of the validation should be to assess the scheme’s impact on the operational efficiency of the military. All other repercussions are secondary.
Going through one complete life cycle of Agniveers will enable a greater understanding of how they will fit into different roles, from combat to logistics to technical services. Each of these roles require different skills and adaptation to different conditions. The four-year period would also reveal how the Agniveers react as they approach the end of their contractual period and move to a satisfactory second career.
After conducting a comprehensive review, the Armed Forces should present their findings to the Government. The conclusions should focus on assessing the Agnipath scheme’s impact on the military’s operational effectiveness. Thereafter if required, the government should implement changes in the scheme or revert to status quo.
The Agnipath scheme is a radical initiative to reform the recruitment of troops into the Armed Forces. The jury is still out as to whether it is a transformative scheme or a bolt from the blue thrust upon the Services. However, it must be borne in mind that while change is necessary, it must be balanced with continuity and be well thought through.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Maj Gen VK Singh, VSM was commissioned into The Scinde Horse in Dec 1983. The officer has commanded an Independent Recce Sqn in the desert sector, and has the distinction of being the first Armoured Corps Officer to command an Assam Rifles Battalion in Counter Insurgency Operations in Manipur and Nagaland, as well as the first General Cadre Officer to command a Strategic Forces Brigade. He then commanded 12 Infantry Division (RAPID) in Western Sector. The General is a fourth generation army officer.
Major General Jagatbir Singh was commissioned into 18 Cavalry in December 1981. During his 38 years of service in the Army he has held various command, staff and instructional appointments and served in varied terrains in the country. He has served in a United Nations Peace Keeping Mission as a Military Observer in Iraq and Kuwait. He has been an instructor to Indian Military Academy and the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. He is a prolific writer in defence & national security and adept at public speaking.
